




Eligible assets, investment strategies and investor 
protection in light of modern portfolio theory:  
Towards a risk-based approach for UCITS 
Jean-Pierre Casey* 
 
The exercise of defining eligible assets and attempting to regulate investment risk for UCITS is outdated. It is neither 
sustainable given the existing institutional framework, nor does it adequately take account of the lessons of modern portfolio 
theory. Through a little example comprised of building two different portfolios, one deemed UCITS-eligible and the other 
not, this Policy Brief highlights in unambiguous fashion that there are clearly cases where regulating investment policies – 
choice of assets as well as placement restrictions – makes retail unit-holders worse off. The main policy implication of this 
exercise, which is rooted in modern portfolio theory, is that Section V of the UCITS Directive, which covers investment 
policy obligations, ought to be done away with altogether in favour of a risk-based approach. This Policy Brief presents a 
new investor protection architecture for UCITS and proposes a solution to the worsening existential crisis of ‘when is a 




For reasons linked to investor protection, the original 1985 
UCITS Directive
1 restricted investments that carried the 
UCITS label to listed shares and bonds. In the wake of the 
Financial Services Action Plan, however, it became clear 
that the internal market for investment management was 
still very fragmented, not least because the regulatory 
framework surrounding it was badly in need of an 
overhaul. One essential component of the overhaul was to 
expand the list of assets into which UCITS-labelled funds 
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1 Council Directive 85/611/EEC of December 20 1985 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to Undertakings in Collective Investments 
in Transferable Securities. Henceforth, all references to the 
‘Directive’ relate to the (consolidated) version of the UCITS 
Directive. The consolidated version incorporates the 
amendments made through subsequent revisions to the 
original directive and does not have legal value strictly 
speaking, but referring to one text instead of several will 
avoid confusion. The consolidated version of the directive can 
be found at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/consleg/pdf/1985/en_1985L0611_do_001.pdf 
 
could invest, in order to reflect the changes introduced by 
financial innovation and investment strategies over the past 
two decades. This revision came in the form of the so-
called Product Directive
2, which sought to widen the scope 
for investments into new asset classes beyond mere stocks 
and bonds. Indeed, the list was expanded to include 
financial derivatives, money market instruments, bank 
deposits, indices, units of other UCITS and non-UCITS 
funds. 
Nevertheless, as the experience of the past three years has 
shown, the so-called Product Directive has left something 
to be desired, not least because national regulators have 
come to different interpretations as to what constitutes an 
UCITS-eligible asset. A single market in asset 
management cannot arise if national regulators interpret 
and implement Community law in divergent manners, 
hence the need to establish common definitions where 
ambiguous provisions sow confusion. A second drawback 
of the Product Directive is that it no longer accurately 
reflects the range of products available for investing and 
hedging purposes (in order for the fund manager to engage 
in efficient portfolio management and risk mitigation).  
Though it has very limited comitology
3 powers in the 
policy area of asset management, the Commission 
                                                        
2 Directive 2001/108/EC of January 21 2002 of the European 
Parliament and the Council 
3 The process by which established committees  assist the 
Commission in the exercise of its executive powers where the 
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nevertheless can ask the European Securities Committee to 
implement subsidiary legislation related to a “clarification 
of definitions” based on Art. 53a of the UCITS Directive.  
The two aforementioned limitations of the Product 
Directive pushed the European Commission to update the 
existing legislation by mandating CESR to explore prior to 
its drafting up-to-date implementing legislation to present 
to the European Securities Committee for a vote, based on 
CESR’s recommendations. The process first began with 
the publication of a call for evidence by CESR
4 in October 
2004 following a mandate from the European 
Commission. The stock-taking and consultation exercise 
was supposed to be concluded in a year and the final 
guidelines to be published in October 2005. However, 
these guidelines were only completed in January 2006, and 
a working document
5 with a draft Regulation
6 on the 
clarification of the definitions concerning eligible assets 
for UCITS appeared in March 2006. The prospects that 
CESR’s technical advice (as modified by the Commission) 
will be incorporated into a regulation before October 2006 
are therefore slim. Based on this experience, the process of 
defining eligible assets can therefore be said to take 
roughly two years.  
As the European Commission undertakes to publish its 
White Paper on the enhancement of the EU framework for 
investment funds (scheduled for November 2006), now is a 
good time to reflect on whether the UCITS framework 
needs a radical overhaul if the regulatory landscape is 
going to adapt itself to the reality of market evolutions. 
There is no doubt that over the past twenty years the 
UCITS label has been a successful instrument for 
facilitating cross-border investments in authorised 
collective investment schemes while at the same time 
providing a high level of investor protection. Nevertheless, 
the limitations of the UCITS Directive as it currently 
stands are becoming readily more apparent. The most 
obvious of these is the outdated product approach, by 
which the UCITS regulatory architecture rests on the 
certification of specific products that are deemed eligible 
for investments of UCITS.  
                                                                                                
Council and the European Parliament have authorised the 
Commission to establish subsidiary legislation to bring into 
effect a broader piece of legislation that they have introduced.  
4 CESR/04-586 Call for Evidence on possible modifications 
to the UCITS Directive in the form of a clarification of 
definitions concerning eligible assets for investments of 
UCITS 
5 ESC/14/2006  Background note on the ESC working 
document, 17 March 2006 
6 ESC/13/2006 Elements for a possible Commission 
Regulation on the clarification of definitions under the 
UCITS-Directive, 17 March 2006 
 
 
This Policy Brief is organised in the following manner: 
Section II discusses whether the exercise of defining 
eligible assets makes sense, given the pace of financial 
innovation and the lessons of modern portfolio theory; 
Section III demonstrates how to calculate portfolio risk; 
Section IV gives a concrete example as to how the UCITS 
Directive’s investment policies restrictions can adversely 
impact the welfare of the retail investor; Section V outlines 
the two main types of risk a retail investor incurs when 
entrusting his wealth to a portfolio manager and how the 
UCITS Directive seeks to address these risk; Section VI 
argues for a fundamental rethink of the investor protection 
architecture governing UCITS, offering concrete policy 
recommendations; Section VII outlines some of the 
challenges of the new approach, and the risk that its 
benefits could be limited if public authorities would 
continue to regulate investment risk; Section VIII 
concludes. 
 
II.  Does defining eligible assets any longer make 
sense?  
 
There are two main reasons why the exercise of defining 
eligible assets in the context of the UCITS directive, i.e. 
the “product approach”, is often portrayed as defunct. 
First, the institutional framework is not well adapted to it. 
The Lamfalussy framework still does not apply to UCITS, 
thereby slowing down the necessary adaptation of EU 
legislation in light of evolutions in financial markets. Even 
with a Lamfalussy-type framework, however, it is not clear 
that the exercise of defining eligible assets would be any 
quicker or easier. Once the Commission had determined 
that an unclear ‘definition’ of ‘eligible assets’ hampered 
the uniform application of the UCITS directive across the 
EU and mandated CESR to assist it, the process still took a 
good two years, probably because it had far less to do with 
finding a common definition in the linguistic sense than 
involve a very technical policy debate on the selection of 
given instruments.  
Given the sheer sweat and toil it took to update the list of 
eligible assets for UCITS over the past two years, one has 
to ask whether it really makes sense to engage in such an 
exercise every 3-4 years in order for the UCITS framework 
to remain up to speed with market developments. As long 
as the “product approach” prevails, the inevitable trade-off 
will be to balance the needs of investment managers to 
have a regularly updated legislative framework that will 
allow them to invest in new ranges of financial assets on 
the one hand, and the sheer cost in terms of public 
resources to go through the painstaking exercise of 
periodically updating the list of eligible assets on the other 
hand.  
The second reason why the “product approach” that 
underpins the UCITS Directive no longer make sense is 
that it does not reflect the lessons modern portfolio theory 
teaches for investment management. The logic behind this TOWARDS A RISK-BASED APPROACH FOR UCITS| 3 
argument is explained in the next two sections, which 
demonstrate through a little exercise why arbitrary 
quantitative investment limits and restrictions on asset 
choice can actually reduce the range of possibilities for a 
fund manager to reduce risk, and thus make a given 
UCITS portfolio a possibly riskier prospect. 
Modern portfolio theory can be distinguished from 
classical portfolio theory in several important respects, not 
least because it revolutionized the way we think about risk. 
In the past, asset managers thought that a good proxy for 
the riskiness of a portfolio was simply the sum of the risk 
inherent in the individual securities that make up the 
portfolio. In other words, the standard perception was that 
by adding a risky security to a portfolio, invariably, the 
portfolio would become a riskier prospect.  
Not so according to Harry Markowitz, whose nobel prize-
winning insight
7 was that when determining asset 
allocation in the context of a portfolio, an asset’s 
individual riskiness gives an incomplete picture as to how 
adding the security would contribute to the overall 
portfolio risk – what really matters is how closely the 
asset’s returns (however risky) would covary with the 
portfolio returns, i.e., to what degree adding the security 
could contribute to portfolio diversification. Invariably, a 
more diversified portfolio is a less risky investment 
prospect than one in which the asset allocation is 
concentrated in a small core of assets with similar return 
patterns. A security’s (subjective) value to a portfolio 
manager is therefore determined by the degree to which 
adding it can lower overall portfolio risk. Paradoxically, 
adding an asset that is individually riskier can lower the 
risk of the overall portfolio.  
This is a lesson that has been lost on EU 
legislators/regulators, since the UCITS “product 
approach”, which defines strict quantitative limits and 
precludes certain types of investment, still remains firmly 
rooted in the pre-Markowitz mindset.  
The little exercise in Section IV demonstrates how 
precisely adding riskier assets to a collective pool of assets 
under management can contribute to a lower absolute level 
of risk in the portfolio, as well as to a lower relative level 
of risk.  
 
III. Measuring  portfolio  risk 
 
To begin with, one must define the notion of risk as it is 
commonly understood in the world of finance. In finance 
as in other fields, risk can best be thought of in terms of 
uncertainty. The more uncertain an investment prospect, 
the riskier it is. With zero risk, an investor knows with 
absolute certitude that an investment made at time t will 
                                                        
7 Harry Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection”, Journal of Finance 
7 (March 1952), pp. 77-91.  
yield a return of x at time t+1. However, once risk is 
introduced into the equation, the investor no longer knows 
with certainty whether the realized return at time t+1 will 
match the return he expected ex-ante.  
In the case of portfolio management, uncertainty can be 
thought of as asset volatility, whether in prices or in yields. 
The greater the volatility of an asset’s price/return, the 
greater the associated risk, since the uncertainty 
surrounding the asset’s price/realized return at the maturity 
date of an investment increases. A high dispersion 
(volatility) around the historical average returns means that 
there is only a small probability that the realized return 
will match the investor’s expected return. On the other 
hand, a narrow dispersion around the historical average 
returns would lead an investor to be fairly confident that he 
will earn a return.  
Hence, it is important to measure portfolio volatility 
(dispersion of prices/returns around the historical average 
price/return) if one is interested in quantifying the risk 
inherent in an investment.
8 For an individual asset, 
dispersion is easy to quantify. However, when assets with 
different risks and returns are pooled together into a 
collective investment, calculating the volatility of the 
portfolio’s return on investment becomes more 
complicated. The volatility of the portfolio return is not 
equal to the sum of the volatilities of the individual assets 
that comprise the portfolio. Rather, it is defined as the 
squares of the individual asset’s weighted risk (with 
weights assigned by the proportion in value terms an asset 
takes up in the portfolio) plus a term that captures the 
degree to which the returns of these assets covary. 












1 2 σ σ ρ σ σ x x x x + +  
 
Calculating the extent to which the returns of the assets in 
a portfolio are correlated (that is, move in sync) is an 
important component in determining portfolio risk. 
Holding two assets whose returns move in lock step will 
                                                        
8 Standard deviation is the most common measure of statistical 
dispersion, measuring how spread out the values in a data set are. 
Therefore, it is frequently used in finance to measure asset volatility. 
If the data points are all close to the mean, then the standard 
deviation is low (closer to zero). If many data points are very 
different from the mean, then the standard deviation is high (further 
from zero). If all the data values are equal, then the standard 
deviation will be zero. In finance, the standard deviation is a 
common measure for volatility: the more a stock's returns vary 
around the stock's historical average return, the more volatile the 
stock. Likewise, variance is another common proxy for volatility. It 
is simply the square of the standard deviation. 
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not lead to a well-diversified portfolio. In a 2-asset 
portfolio, the lesser the degree to which asset returns 
covary, the greater is the probability that asset 1’s high 
returns offset asset 2’s low returns at time t, and vice-
versa. As a consequence, the lower the covariance between 
the assets in a portfolio, the more diversified it is and the 
less the overall portfolio risk will depend on the riskiness 
of the individual assets.  
 
IV.  An example of how investment restrictions can 
reduce investor welfare 
 
To show how unit-holders could be made worse off by the 
restrictions UCITS imposes on eligible assets/investment 
strategies, this section comprises a little example that 
compares the risk and return profiles of two portfolios: one 
that could be potentially marketed as a UCITS, and 
another that would not qualify. The UCITS-eligible fund 
9 
in our example  (Portfolio 1) is comprised of two eligible 
‘transferable securities’, common equity shares. On the 
other hand, suppose that Portfolio 2 violates UCITS 
eligibility criteria because it includes an asset with an 
embedded derivative that fails to satisfy the appropriate 
conditions spelled out in Art.s 21-22 of the UCITS 
Directive. The fact that Portfolio 2 is off limits to UCITS 
unit-holders raises an important policy question: does this 
restriction improve or hurt retail investor welfare?  
Before we proceed to give an answer, we first describe the 
two portfolios in greater detail to facilitate comparisons. 
Imagine that there are 3 available assets with which a 
portfolio can be constructed: 2 stocks and 1 CDO.
10 
Suppose that portfolios only include 2 assets. Portfolio 1 is 
composed only of Stock 1 and Stock 2. Portfolio 2 is 
                                                        
9 Although technically speaking Portfolio 2 would not either 
qualify as a UCITS portfolio
*, the example has been kept 
simple for the purposes of illustration, and can easily be 
extended to include enough stocks that the portfolio could 
qualify as a UCITS.  
*The UCITS Directive establishes very strict criteria on 
investment policies. Portfolio 2 in the example above does not 
qualify as a UCITS because the portfolio is only comprised of 
2 stocks, whereas Art. 22.1 states that not more than 5% of a 
UCITS assets can be investments in transferable securities 
issued by the same body. There are exceptions. Art. 22.2 
allows Member States to increase the investment limit in any 
given security to 10% of portfolio value, provided that all 
together, these assets exceeding the 5% limit do not constitute 
more than 40% of the portfolio. Art. 22A allows up to 20% of 
a UCITS’ assets to be invested in a single security if the 
investment strategy involves index replication. Under 
‘exceptional circumstances’, this limit can even be extended 
to 35%. 
10 A CDO (Collateralised Debt Obligation) is a complex 
financial instrument whose characteristics may not allow it to 
qualify as a UCITS-eligible asset in our example. 
composed of only of CDO 1 and Stock 2. The returns and 








Stock 1  8%  10 
Stock 2  7%  8 
CDO 1  10%  20 
 
The CDO yields the highest return, yet individually, it is 
also the riskiest of the investments, as measured by the 
standard deviation. In fact, the CDO in this example is 
twice as risky as Stock 1 and 2.5 times riskier than Stock 
2. We suppose that due to the complex nature of, and risk 
inherent in, this instrument, it is akin to an instrument that 
has not been considered UCITS-eligible.  
At first sight, the legislators/regulators’ statutory 
provisions forbidding the CDO from UCITS eligibility 
may seem to be vindicated: as Table I shows, the CDO 
contains a degree of risk that is significantly greater than 
that of the two other available assets, yet the yield does not 
seem to compensate for the increased level of risk: it is not 
proportional to the level of risk undertaken. Whereas the 
CDO is twice as risky as Stock 1 (i.e., 100% riskier) and 
2.5 times as risky as Stock 2 (i.e., 150% riskier), it yields a 
premium of only 25% over the return of Stock 1 and of 
only 43% over Stock 2. Hence, that the CDO is excluded 
from UCITS eligibility seems to make sense at first glance: 
investors do not seem to be compensated proportionally 
for the increased risk they undertake. We will now show 
why this view is simply wrong, recalling the lessons of 
Section III that it is not an asset’s individual riskiness that 
matters most when attempting to diversify portfolio risk. 
Before we calculate the overall risk in each of these two 
example portfolios, we need a couple more variables, 
namely the correlation coefficients which measure how the 
returns of the assets held in either portfolio covary. These 
correlation coefficients are given in Table II. Portfolio 2 is 
a well diversified portfolio, because the CDO is only 
weakly correlated with the other asset in the portfolio, 
Stock 2. The correlation coefficient between the two is 
only 0.1.
11 On the other hand, Portfolio 1 is poorly 
                                                        
11 Correlation coefficient is a statistic that measures how 
closely two variables that are randomly distributed through 
time move together. It can take values between 0 and 1. If the 
returns of two assets move in lock step, the correlation 
coefficient equals 1. If the returns are independent of each 
other, that is, if they do not respond to any of the same 
information/impulses, then the correlation coefficient is 0.  TOWARDS A RISK-BASED APPROACH FOR UCITS| 5 
diversified because the correlation of returns between 
Stock 1 and Stock 2 is high at 0.95. 
 
Table II: Correlations of returns  
 
  Stock 1  Stock 2  CDO 
Stock 1  1  0.95  n/a 
Stock 2  0.95  1  0.1 
CDO n/a  0.1  1 
 
Supposing that only four variables matter when 
determining the construction of a portfolio (namely, the 
asset’s return, its individual risk, how the asset’s return 
covaries with the risk of other assets in the portfolio, the 
weight to assign a given asset in a portfolio), we now have 
enough information to compare the two portfolios in terms 
of both risk and return. We first begin with a comparison 
of the risk profiles of the respective portfolios.  
 
V.I  Comparing absolute risk across portfolios 
 
Suppose that the allocation of assets in Portfolio 1 is such 
that in value terms, Stock 1 makes up 70% of the 
investment and Stock 2 comprises 30% of the investment. 
Suppose also that the allocation of assets in Portfolio 2 is 
such that in value terms, CDO 1 comprises 30% of the 
investment and Stock 2 70% of the investment.  
 
Table III: Portfolio 1 Risk 
 
















0.70 100  0.95 
Stock 
2 




Table IV: Portfolio 2 Risk 
 
















0.30 400  0.1 
Stock 
2 




It is important to notice something unusual in the example 
given: both portfolios are identically risky (with a variance 
of returns of 70.72),
12 even though they are composed of 
different assets which have different individual risk. That 
the risk profiles of these two portfolios (given by the 
variance of the portfolio returns) is identical is accidental, 
but it will allow for an interesting comparison. If two 
portfolios are identically risky, then the variable that will 
really matter in discriminating them in terms of the better 
investment is the yield each offers. But before comparing 
the respective portfolio yields, let us stretch the example a 
little further by tinkering with the allocation of the assets 
within Portfolio 1 such that the weights assigned to each 
stock are modified slightly. Doing so will enable us to 
show that it is possible to derive theoretical cases such as 
this example, where adding a risky instrument to a 
portfolio not does not increase portfolio risk but rather 
reduces it, all the while improving the portfolio’s 
performance (!)  
 
Table V: Portfolio 3 Risk 
 
















0.71 100  0.95 
Stock 
2 




The new portfolio, which effectively is Portfolio 1 with 
different weights assigned to the assets that comprise it, we 
call Portfolio 3. By slightly shifting the weights in 
Portfolio 1, we obtain a variance of 71.44, which is greater 
than the variance of the original Portfolio 1. More 
interestingly, Portfolio 3, despite being comprised of 
individually not too risky assets, is actually riskier than 
Portfolio 2, which holds an asset that is individually far 
riskier than those that make up Portfolio 3. Thus, we 
obtain the paradoxical result that the fund which includes 
an asset that is not eligible for UCITS is actually less risky 
than the one that is deemed to hold UCITS-eligible 
assets(!) 
                                                        
12 That is, they are equally risky when risk is uni-dimensional 
and entails only volatility (measured as portfolio variance). 6 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
We have just demonstrated that in theory at least, it is 
possible for a portfolio comprised of assets that are 
individually risky to be less risky than a portfolio which is 
comprised of assets that are individually less risky. Thus, 
we have compared the performance of two different 
portfolios in terms of absolute risk. Yet absolute risk is 
only one criterion among several that can be used to 
measure the relative performance of different portfolios. 
Simply comparing the absolute levels of risk in each 
portfolio is not enough to make an informed choice as to 
the which portfolio is superior, because doing so assumes 
that the returns of both portfolios are identical. But what 
happens when the portfolios offer different returns ? When 
one portfolio yields a far higher return than another one, 
does it make sense to compare them merely on the basis of 
absolute risk? We argue  not. Having already shown how 
the non-UCITS fund (Portfolio 2) outperformed the 
UCITS fund (Portfolio 3) in terms of absolute risk (it has a 
lower variance), we will now demonstrate how the non-
UCITS fund can outperform the UCITS fund in terms of 
absolute return.  
 
V.II  Comparing absolute returns across portfolios 
 
The return on a given portfolio is equal to the weighted 
average of the returns of the individual assets contained 




Portfolio return 2 2 1 1 R R Rp α α + = , where  1 2 1 = +α α  
1 α  and  2 α  denote the weights each asset is assigned in 
the portfolio and  1 R  and 2 R  denote the returns of asset 1 
and asset 2, respectively.  1 2 1 = +α α  is a restricting 
condition, which simply means that the portfolio is not 
leveraged (in other words, one cannot borrow to invest). 
Plugging the respective average returns of Stock 1, Stock 2 
and CDO 1 (which are given in Table I) and the weights 
each asset is assigned in each portfolio (which are give in 
Tables IV and V), into Equation 2, one obtains the 
absolute return for the respective portfolios. Obtaining 
these figures will allow us to continue comparing our 
example portfolios on the basis of whether the UCITS 
asset choice and investment policy restrictions make sense. 
The returns of each portfolio are displayed in the first 

















7.70% 70.72  8.41  0.92 
Portfolio 
2 
7.9% 70.72  8.41  0.94 
Portfolio 
3 
7.71% 71.4408  8.45  0.91 
 
As one can see, Portfolio 2 (non-UCITS) outperforms both 
UCITS portfolios in terms of absolute returns, registering 
a 7.9% absolute return against 7.7% and 7.71%, 
respectively for the portfolios that contain UCITS-eligible 
assets.  
 
V.III  Comparing portfolio efficiency (relative risk) 
 
A third and final way to compare the performance of two 
portfolios composed of different assets is to quantify how 
efficient they are in terms of asset allocation. In the 
theoretical literature, portfolio efficiency means that the 
manager obtains the highest possible return, given the level 
of risk he is allowed to undertake, a variable known as the 









p σ  denotes the standard deviation (risk) of the portfolio, 
and  p R the portfolio’s return.  The higher the value of this 
variant of the Sharpe ratio, the more efficient the 
investment, since it leverages all the return that a given 
risk level can offer. Dividing the average return of each 
portfolio by the risk inherent in that portfolio in our 3 
portfolio example gives us column 4 in Table VI. 
Portfolio 2 displays a ratio of 0.94, compared with 0.92 
and 0.91 for Portfolios 2 and 3, respectively. Because 
Portfolio 2 (non-UCITS) yields a higher return for the 
given level of risk that is inherent in the portfolio, it is a 
more attractive and more efficient risk prospect than either TOWARDS A RISK-BASED APPROACH FOR UCITS| 7 




V.IV   Policy implications of the example in Section V 
 
In our example, Portfolio 2, which is non-UCITS eligible 
due to the presence of an exotic, risky CDO product within 
the portfolio, has outperformed the UCITS fund in all three 
categories that matter when comparing fund 
performance
13: 
  Absolute risk (it is less risky) 
  Absolute return (it yields a higher absolute return) 
  Efficiency (it yields a higher return for a given 
level of risk) 
 
It is important to note that the little quantitative exercise 
performed in this section is merely illustrative. There is no 
guarantee that such a situation would occur in the real 
world. A caveat is that the results depend on the given 
assumptions. Several key assumptions were made in this 
section, which helped to generate the outcome that was 
shown:  
  Low correlation between the exotic (non-UCITS) 
instrument and the stock 
  High correlation between the two stocks’ returns 
14 
  2-asset portfolios designated 
15 
  Weights of individual assets in each portfolio 
randomly assigned 
  Returns of individual assets randomly assigned 
  Risks of individual assets randomly assigned 
 
Tinkering with any of these assumptions will yield 
different results, with the very real possibility that the non-
UCITS Portfolio 2 might well underperform the UCITS 
fund in all three performance measures: absolute return, 
absolute risk and relative return/risk (portfolio effiency). It 
                                                        
13 Assuming of course that there are no transaction costs or 
fees charged. 
14 This is not necessarily a very generous assumption: stock 
returns are known to have quite a high correlation in general, 
since an important determinant of returns is the growth rate of 
the economy, which affects all stocks. 
15 This is not necessarily a great weakness of the example we 
offer: adding securities to a portfolio is certainly not a 
sufficient condition for the portfolio to be diversified. Rather 
than the number of securities in a portfolio. This is another 
area in which the UCITS directive can be deemed to be 
deficient (i.e. it only established but says nothing about the 
correlation of asset returns). 
 
might even be the case that Portfolio 2 underperforms the 
UCITS fund in a majority of different scenarios as the 
parameters are changed.  
 
However, we do not believe that this caveat undermines 
the point we are trying to make. While the assumptions 
that were made could rightly be called into question, the 
example serves to convey a powerful lesson, as stylised 
examples often do, however simplistic their detractors 
purport them to be. This example has shown that it is 
possible, at least in theory, for a non-UCITS eligible fund 
to outperform the UCITS fund across the board. That such 
an outcome is possible in theory suggests that with the 
right combination of assets, there is a real chance that a 
similar outcome is possible in practice too.  
This brings us to the policy implications of the exercise. 
First, the example shows that restrictions imposed on asset 
classes and restrictions on investment strategies (given by 
the weights assigned to each asset in the example) can 
make retail investors worse off: adding a riskier security to 
the portfolio or increasing its weight in a portfolio may 
actually make the portfolio less risky overall; likewise, a 
portfolio that holds an individually riskier asset may yield 
a more efficient risk-return ratio and thus represent a better 
use of invested capital. Excluding opportunities for more 
efficient portfolios to compete on an equal footing with 
UCITS products simply because they contain (an) asset(s) 
that is not eligible under UCITS is not conducive to 
financial market efficiency or competitiveness. Indeed, if 
the cause for excluding certain investments is concern for 
the retail investor, it ought to be borne in mind that these 
same restrictions the UCITS Directive places can equally 
damage the interests of the retail investor, in cases similar 
to those given in our quantitative example above.  
A second important policy lesson from the exercise is that 
it shows that the frame of mind governing the UCITS 
investor protection architecture is antiquated – what 
matters less than absolute risk is relative risk. Risk and 
return are complementary: reasoning only in terms of risk 
while ignoring the associated returns makes little sense. 
Therefore, an investor protection strategy that is guided 
only by absolute investment risk considerations is likely to 
be detrimental to the interests of the very group it is meant 
to protect. This argument is spelled out in more detail in 
Section VII. 
 
V.   Profiling risk for the retail investor 
 
When a retail investor entrusts a money manager to invest 
his savings in a collective investment scheme, there are 
two fundamental types of risk he incurs: investment risk 
and agency risk. Both types of risk can have an impact on 
the absolute and relative returns the investor earns from his 
investment, and both have the potential to jeopardize the 
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risk so that one can better appreciate the various sources of 
risk and the areas where investor protection measures 
ought to concentrate. 
 
V.I  What is agency risk? And how does the UCITS 
Directive address agency risk? Does the UCITS Directive 
take the right approach to agency risk? 
 
Agency risk is a type of risk that arises out of the fiduciary 
nature of financial services. When delegating an agent to 
perform a service, in this case to manage a portfolio of 
assets, an investor trusts that the money manager will 
pursue his clients’ best interest. However, the client is at 
an immediate informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
money manager because (1) he does not know ex-ante the 
quality of the service he will receive. (2) it is even difficult 
to measure the quality of the service ex-post.
16  
Because the money manager knows better than the client 
the quality of the service he can provide, unless the 
former’s incentives are properly aligned to those of the 
latter, there is no guarantee he will consistently pursue 
what is in their best interest. In other words, the most 
common form of agency risk arises from the presence of 
conflicts of interest. Agency risks gives rise to agency 
costs, whereby investors need to either monitor the 
activities of the asset manager directly themselves or hire 
someone else to do it. Collective investments may not deal 
well with agency risk because of the so-called “collective 
action problem”.
17 The collective action problem states 
that nobody will do the monitoring, because all investors 
in the scheme expect someone else to. At the same time, a 
hoard of retail investors may not have the financial 
knowledge necessary to properly monitor the investment 
manager nor can they exploit the economies of scale that 
arise out of delegating the function of monitoring the 
activities of the hired agent. Hence the need for a third 
party to do it. 
In the UCITS framework, the depositary is entrusted with 
safekeeping a unit trust’s assets and ensuring that the 
portfolio manager’s activities correspond to the unit-
holders’ interests. Art. 7 spells out the obligations of the 
depositary, which include: ensuring that fund rules and 
statutory regulation are respected as regards the issuance, 
sale, redemption, re-purchase, and cancellation of units ; 
ensuring net asset value calculation are consistent with the 
prospectus ; a requirement to establish a head office in the 
same Member State as the management company (to 
                                                        
16 For a more detailed description of agency risk as it pertains 
to finance, see Llewellyn, David, 1999, The Economic 
Rationale for Financial Regulation, FSA Occasional Paper 
Series 1, April 
17 Olson, Mancur, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action  : 
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 
facilitate monitoring) ; a requirement to be overseen by a 
public authority. 
However, because similar agency risks arise in the relation 
between the depositary and the unit-holders, there is no 
guarantee that the former will effectively conduct proper 
oversight of the fund manager’s activities. In order to do 
so, the incentive structure for the depositary must be 
aligned with the interests of the principals who hire it. 
Hence Art. 10 of the UCITS Directive, which governs 
conflicts of interest regarding the depositary.
18  
A second necessary regulatory measure to reduce agency 
risks is to ensure that money managers who are allowed to 
manage UCITS funds are professionally qualified 
investors who are recognized for their competence and 
integrity. Art. 5a.1.b of the UCITS Directive directly 
covers this requirement.
19  
A third is the prohibition for a management company to 
transform a fund that was marketed as a UCITS and which 
comes under the scope of the Directive into a non-UCITS 
fund (Art. 1.5), in order to prevent managers from 
surprising investors ex-post, once their investment was 
already made. 
In Art.s 27-35, the UCITS Directive seeks to redress the 
information imbalance between the fund manager and the 
unit-holders in a fourth regulatory measure to pare down 
agency risks by imposing disclosure requirements on the 
management company, which include strict and detailed 
provisions regarding the  publishing of: a simplified 
prospectus, a full prospectus, an annual report, a half-
yearly report (Art. 27); information regarding the issue, 
sale, re-purchase or redemption price of fund UCITS each 
time they are issued, sold, redeemed or bought back, and at 
least twice a month (Art. 34).  
Other risks that arise out of entrusting a fund manager with 
one’s savings, and which are commonly referred to as 
operational risks we categorise as agency risks for the sake 
of simplicity of exposure, since the operational risks a 
management company incurs while providing services to 
unit-holders can, broadly speaking, be interpreted as an 
attendant risk arising out of a fiduciary relationship. In 
other words, if the asset management company fails to put 
into place proper operational controls that will prevent 
large losses from trading or IT systems failures, etc. then 
                                                        
18 Art. 10.1 reads: “No single company shall act as both 
management company and depositary.” Art. 10.2 reads: “In 
the context of their respective roles the management company 
and depositary must act independently and solely in the 
interest of unit-holders.” 
19 “…the persons who effectively conduct the business of a 
management company are of sufficiently good repute and are 
sufficiently experienced also in relation to the type of UCITS 
managed by the management company. To that end, the 
names of these persons and of every person succeeding them 
in office must be communicated forthwith to the competent 
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he is not acting in his clients’ best interest (i.e., agency 
risk). Operational safeguards relating to sound 
administrative and accounting procedures, arrangements 
for electronic data processing, adequate internal controls 
amount to a fifth safeguard against agency risk (more 
broadly defined) and are covered by Art. 5f. Capital 
requirements for the fund management company are 
covered by Art. 5a. 
In addition to these safeguards, the ultimate safeguard 
remains the authorization procedure (Art. 4), which grants 
the supervisory authority the power to accept or reject 
granting the UCITS label to a fund, based on whether all 
the safeguards built into the Directive have been 
observed.
20  
In conclusion, to answer the last question in the heading of 
Section VI.I ‘Does the UCITS Directive take the right 
approach to agency risk?’  we believe the answer is a firm 
‘yes’. That these ancillary risks as well as the core agency 
risks of conflicts of interest are strictly regulated by the 
UCITS Directive makes eminent sense. Together, they 
ensure the quality of the UCITS brand and generate a high 
degree of investor confidence.  
 
V.II  What is investment risk? And how does the UCITS 
Directive address investment risk? Does the UCITS 
Directive take the right approach to agency risk 
 
Anybody who is familiar with finance theory or portfolio 
management knows that there are two types of investment 
risk in financial markets. The first is idiosyncratic risk, 
which is the risk inherent in a given security. The second is 
market risk (also known as systematic risk), a risk that is 
inherent to the economy itself, cutting across all sectors 
and asset classes. The enlightening discovery of the 
pioneers of modern portfolio theory was that idiosyncratic 
risk could be fully eliminated so long as a portfolio was 
sufficiently well diversified. On the other hand, no degree 
of diversification will ever be able to eliminate market 
risk.  
In other words, risk is never fully diversifiable. Any 
investment, however safe it may appear, inevitably entails 
a degree of risk. A fundamental tenet of economic theory 
states that one ought not to expect any returns above and 
beyond the natural rate of growth of the economy if one 
does not undertake any risk. Indeed, if there were a risk-
less asset that yielded a high return, everybody would rush 
                                                        
20 Some observers have that certain national authorities such 
as those of Ireland and Luxembourg do not carry out their 
supervisory responsibilities with sufficient vigour by simply 
rubber-stamping prospectuses without looking too closely 
into the risk structure built into a fund in order to maintain 
their position as the major financial centres for the asset 
management industry in Europe. In this case, authorization 
could not be seen as the ‘ultimate’ safeguard. 
into it and bid up the price until the capital gains (yield) 
were minimal. Since risk is intrinsic to the financial 
system, one has to wonder to what extent legislative 
measures aimed at ‘removing’ risk – or, at the least, 
drawing an upper bound on an ‘acceptable’ level of risk 
for a given product, such as a UCITS – are truly effective. 
By establishing strict quantitative limits on portfolio 
holdings of certain types of financial instrument, defining 
eligible assets that can be included in a UCITS portfolio 
and by prohibiting certain investment strategies, the 
UCITS Directive effectively seeks to circumscribe or cap 
the total risk that is undertaken by a UCITS management 
company.  
Because we are highly critical of the ‘product approach’ in 
the UCITS Directive and are not convinced that the 
benefits of regulating investment risks outweigh the costs 
(as we have attempted to show in our detailed example in 
Section V), we will not describe the Directive’s restrictions 
on investment strategies and use of instruments in any 
detail. Suffice it to say that UCITS imposes stringent 
requirements on eligible assets and (arbitrary) quantitative 
thresholds on investment placements in Art.s 19-26, to 
which the reader is referred.  
Precisely how statutory rules can be drawn up by the 
legislator to set an upper bound on the level of risk that is 
deemed to be ‘acceptable’ across all states of nature and 
market conditions and that can satisfy all retail investors’ 
preferences is highly questionable. Is it really the case that 
a UCITS fund is ‘safer’ than a non-UCITS fund across all 
states of nature and market conditions? Will it really 
always and everywhere contain lower investment risk? If 
the answers to these questions are no, then this only 
reinforces the point this Policy Brief is trying to make, 
which is that legislative measures aimed at capping 
investment risk simply do not make sense and amount to a 
false promise. 
Inevitably, perceptions of risk are subjective. Different 
metrics can be used to gauge investment risk. Whereas 
some investors favour absolute loss, others gauge relative 
losses against a benchmark, or absolute returns or relative 
returns against a benchmark. Alternatively, they can 
calculate risk/return ratios. Even more complex approaches 
to risk measurement can be used, such as Value-at-Risk, 
which defines risk in terms of the probability that a certain 
outcome occurs. Depending on which metrics one uses to 
define the level of risk, one will obtain different results. 
Often, the choice of metric will depend on how one 
perceives risk to being with.  
This brings us to a critical point: what is investment risk? 
Is it only the risk of absolute losses? What about the 
opportunity cost of foregoing a more profitable investment 
for a comparable level of risk ? Is that not a risk? Is the 
prospect of poor relative performance not a risk the 
investor incurs when buying into a UCITS? The problem 
with the way investment risk is implicitly defined in the 
UCITS Directive is that it is biased towards the downside. 
There is an asymmetry in the design of the investor 10 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
protection scheme built into the Directive. Apart from the 
fact that statutory regulation can never fully hedge risk not 
least because risk is inherent to any financial investment 
and can never be fully eliminated, UCITS investment rules 
will not always give investment managers the flexibility 
needed to deal with different investment horizons (for 
example, by taking advantage of certain windows of 
opportunity that arise in certain market conditions), to 
adequately respond to sudden parameter shifts in 
investment risk in times of market stress (e.g. when 
traditionally ‘safe’ investments could suddenly become 
much riskier than usual), or to tailor investments to 
investors’ preferred risk/return profiles.  
 
VI.  Rethinking investor protection under UCITS  
 
In order to better appreciate the various sources of risk and 
the areas where statutory investor protection measures 
ought to concentrate, the previous section has defined the 
two principal sources of risk an investor incurs when 
buying into a collective investment scheme: agency risk 
and investment risk. The UCITS Directive has built-in 
safeguards to address both types of risk. Given the lessons 
of the two previous sections, we will now argue how 
exactly the investor protection safeguards that are built 
into the Directive must be modified by proposing a way to 
redesign the UCITS investor protection architecture. 
When the industry and regulators talk about the success of 
UCITS in achieving a high standard of investor protection, 
they are essentially referring to a product that heavily 
regulates the asset management company and the 
depositary so as to mitigate potential conflicts of interest, 
operational risk and other risks associated with entrusting 
one’s savings to a money manager. The fact that there have 
been no major fraudulent activities or scandals in 
European UCITS as there have been in the U.S. mutual 
fund industry only speaks for the success of the strict 
regulatory provisions within the Directive governing the 
principal-agent relationship as a very effective instrument 
to safeguard retail investors from agency risk. It tells 
nothing about the quality of investment management in 
UCITS schemes or how effective the UCITS Directive’s 
provisions are at addressing investment risk. 
 
UCITS has a very effective framework for managing 
agency risk. Disclosure and operating provisions ought 
to remain at the core of the UCITS investor protection 
architecture. They have ensured a gold standard that is 
applied worldwide. 
 
Surprisingly, little has been said about whether UCITS is 
really a good framework when it comes to addressing 
investment risk. It is very odd, for example, that there have 
been no studies comparing the performance of UCITS vs. 
non-UCITS funds in terms of their absolute return, relative 
return (risk/return ratios) or other metrics to gauge relative 
performance. If return/risk ratios of non-UCITS funds are 
consistently, or even occasionally, higher than those of 
UCITS, then one can argue that the restrictions the 
Directive places on eligible assets, investment limits and 
investment strategies are inefficient and ineffective or, in 
the extreme, simply worthless. 
Part of the problem, as identified in Section VI, is that the 
UCITS Directive implicitly thinks of investor protection in 
terms of absolute risk. We argued that this is the wrong 
approach. What matters more than defining an absolute 
level of risk is finding the most efficient combination of 
risk and return. In terms of an investment protection 
strategy, it does not make sense to think only in terms of 
absolute risk, such that an overriding emphasis is placed 
on safeguarding the invested principal, since doing so 
places too much emphasis on downside risk.  
There are a couple of major problems with such an 
approach. First, retail investors will have the (mistaken) 
impression that regulation is designed to cover any 
investment losses, which gives them a false sense of 
security, and second, as we have also argued and sought to 
demonstrate in Sections V-VI , the statutory measures 
against investment risk (in the form of investment 
restrictions) are not foolproof. They are not foolproof even 
against their own standard of risk, and they may be far less 
foolproof if other ways to look at risk are considered (e.g. 
opportunity cost of good investment opportunities 
foregone because the investor was precluded from 
exploiting them by regulatory restrictions on investment 
policies. If an investor places X into a UCITS at time t, 
expecting to get return X + rX at time t + n (where r is the 
return on invested capital and n is the date at which the 
unit-holder wants to sell his stake), because he faces 
liability Z at time t + n and it turns out that X + rX < Z, 
can we really speak of UCITS’ investment policy 
restrictions as sound investor protection? 
 
Investor protection considerations under UCITS 
Section V (investment policies) reason only in terms of 
risk and do not relate risk to return, thereby missing a 
large piece in the investment puzzle. 
 
Rather than be regulated through statutory rules, managing 
investment risk (liquidity, volatility, capital losses, returns) 
ought to be left up to the discretion of a professionally 
qualified money manager in response to his client’s risk 
and investment preferences. It may well be the case that 
retail investors will not always reason in terms of 
maximizing the efficiency of their investments. In fact, 
they may be prepared to sacrifice some efficiency to gain 
greater peace of mind that they are not at a great risk of 
losing their invested capital. But that is a decision 
investors should have the choice to decide for themselves, 
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regulatory framework surrounding UCITS products (not to 
mention that the peace of mind they feel may be misplaced 
confidence). 
Ultimately, it is for more sophisticated investors to 
decide with their own financial advisers or tied agents 
what are their preferred risk metrics, and what level of 
risk they are prepared to undertake, as measured by 
that risk metric. Unsophisticated investors should rely 
on fund managers pursuing their best interests within a 
regulatory framework to mitigate agency risk, as 
opposed to a framework where managers are 
handcuffed in their choice of instruments and 
investment policies.   
 
Tight restrictions on investment policies are also 
dangerous because they give retail investors a false sense 
of security. Defining eligible assets, setting investment 
limits and regulating investment strategies does not in any 
way guarantee the quality of investment management. In 
the hands of an inept portfolio manager, what may appear 
to be a ‘safe’ portfolio can in fact turn out to be a far more 
risky prospect than a portfolio combining derivatives, 
structured products and other exotic investment vehicles in 
the hands of a well-informed and skilful portfolio manager. 
Investment restrictions are never foolproof: long-only 
strategies are not necessarily less risky than long-short 
strategies; adding exotic products to a portfolio can 
dampen volatility in times when asset price/return 
volatility is high. Everything depends on circumstance. 
Risk can never be perfectly circumscribed, nor is there is 
ever such a thing as absolute certainty in the world of 
finance.  
Therefore, far more important considerations than a 
portfolio manager’s asset allocation strategy in generating 
the best return/risk ratios for clients are: (1) that the money 
manager is professionally qualified (e.g. CFA certified) 
competent and upholds a high standard of integrity (2) that 
the money manager can pursue the best interest of his 
clients because his professional activities are not riveted 
with conflicts of interest. Both of these conditions are 
already addressed by the Directive (in Art.s 5a(b), 5f and 
5h). Legislating for investment protection as regards 
investment risk is a false promise. Rather, investment risk 
should be addressed by industry standards/best practices 
regarding risk management, by licensing requirements or 
industry certifications to ensure portfolio manager 
qualifications and competence.  
 
Investment restrictions in Section V of the UCITS 
Directive give investors a false sense of security. They 
do not in any way guarantee the quality of portfolio 
management. 
 
Hence the reason for our argument that when coupled with 
the strict provisions covering agency risk, investment 
restrictions are redundant. They do not form the core of the 
investor protection architecture of UCITS. In a way, as 
long as the investor is properly informed ex-ante about the 
nature of the risks he is undertaking when buying into a 
fund, this obviates the need for quantitative restrictions on 
asset allocation and restrictions on the ability of managers 
to deploy various investment strategies. Quantitative 
placement restrictions and limitations on asset choice 
simply amount to an imperfect substitute for more 
disclosure and better rules governing agency risk.  
Coupled with the Directive’s strict rules on disclosure and 
dealing with conflicts of interest, removing quantitative 
and other investment restrictions will allow UCTIS 
portfolios to be better tailored to investors’ preferences in 
terms of their preferred return/risk profile. Portfolio 
managers will be better equipped to respond to the needs 
of their clients, especially as market conditions are 
constantly in flux. Restrictions on investment strategies 
and asset classes could handicap an asset manager’s ability 
to do so. 
 
Investment restrictions are redundant if the disclosure 
and operational requirements governing collective 
investment schemes are implemented and enforced as 
they were intended, and if the they are coupled with 
proper distribution criteria (e.g. MiFID’s suitability 
and appropriateness tests) such that risky funds are not 
marketed inappropriately to certain retail investors.  
 
We do not advocate throwing out the entire UCITS 
framework. Far from it. A number of safeguards imbedded 
in the UCITS Directive ought to remain at the heart of the 
EU’s architecture for retail investor protection in collective 
investment schemes, since these measures have guaranteed 
the success of UCITS and increased investor confidence in 
financial markets these past twenty years. These provisions 
include what we call the six pillars of investor protection 
in the asset management industry: 
: 
  strict fund authorisation rules 
  adequate risk management framework  
  absence of conflicts of interest 
  proper information disclosure 
  proper regulatory and third-party oversight 
  competent and honest investment professionals 
 
Nevertheless, implementing the recommendations of this 
Policy Brief will require a fundamental rethink on what 
investor protection truly entails. Statutory measures aimed 
at investor protection should concentrate on mitigating 
agency, not investment, risk. In essence, this Policy Brief 
advocates doing away altogether with Section V of the 
UCITS Directive, as radical a step as that may sound. 
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Section V of the UCITS Directive should be abolished 
altogether. It does not reflect the lessons of modern 
portfolio theory. It does not reduce investment risk 
always and everywhere. It has a downside bias based 
on its implicit definition of risk. It requires a strenuous 
periodic exercise of defining eligible assets. 
 
The advantages of this proposal are several, as it would:  
 
  Address the redundancy between imposing strict 
operational rules and disclosure requirements on 
asset management companies on the one hand and 
investment restrictions on the other 
  Allow investment managers to better tailor their 
portfolios to individuals’ preferred return/risk 
profiles by granting the former more flexibility 
with new instruments/investment strategies 
  Eliminate the downside bias of the current 
investment restrictions and remove upside 
investment risks that arise from the opportunity 
cost of portfolio managers not having sufficient 
flexibility  
  Abolish the tedious periodic exercise of defining 
eligible assets UCITS 
  Undermine investor protection because the other 
UCITS investor protection safeguards would 
remain in place 
 
The consequence of this proposal would effectively be to 
redefine the UCITS label. UCITS would cease to be a 
‘product brand’ and instead be trimmed down to become a 
flagship for the highest standards as regards fund 
management integrity, pursuit of the clients’ best interest, 
proper disclosure, effective regulatory and third-party 
oversight, adequate capital requirements, and minimal 
conflicts of interest. The new UCITS would set this high 
standard while still maintaining flexibility in investment 
policies as regards asset choice, asset allocation and 
investment strategy so that portfolio managers can 
leverage their strategies to attain the highest return for the 
given level of risk unit-holders are prepared to undertake 
(the best kind of investor protection to address investment 
risk).  
 
VII.  Defining risk thresholds for investor protection 
against investment risk? 
 
If Section V of UCITS were dispensed with, how would 
this measure affect the level of investment risk in UCITS 
funds? What controls would be in place to ensure that 
portfolio managers did not engage in excessively risky 
investment strategies?  
To begin with, the first line of defence to limit investment 
risk would not change. Fund depositaries would continue 
to be mandated by the UCITS Directive to maintain a close 
eye on the portfolio managers to ensure that the latter 
abide by the investment policies and risk outlooks that are 
outlined in the fund prospectus. In addition to this 
independent third party oversight, regulatory authorities 
would also supervise the fund to ensure that the 
management company’s activities do not deviate from 
what was advertised in the prospectus and that fund 
managers do not engage in fraudulent practices.  
Three essential policy questions arise when moving away 
from a product approach to a risk-based approach: How to 
define and measure risk? Should regulation seek to cap 
risk? Who should identify the level of risk in a fund?  
A risk-based approach would amount to a move to a 
probabilistic approach in calculating investment risk. 
Different techniques exist to calculate risk probabilities, 
but essentially, defining risk would involve calculating 
some type of VaR (the probability of absolute loss X or a 
conditional VaR (probability of an absolute loss up to X or 
beyond X).  
Since a risk-based approach would involve attempting to 
quantify levels of risk in a portfolio by fund managers, 
there may be a temptation for legislators/regulators to 
continue to regulate investment risk but simply change 
their approach from defining investment thresholds on 
certain products to establishing risk thresholds based on 
calculated probabilities. This would essentially entail a 
VaR approach to setting investment restrictions for UCITS 
funds. When industry advocates push for a move to a 
“risk-based approach”, regulators could interpret this as a 
call to refashion the product approach into a “probability 
approach”. We do not recommend this. 
Adopting a risk-based approach to investment risk 
regulation would not solve some of the blatant problems 
embedded in the product approach. Similarly to our 
criticism of the product approach in Section VI, we would 
argue that statutory rules establishing such thresholds 
would remove flexibility form the system and prevent 
portfolio managers from most suitably tailoring investment 
strategies to their clients’ needs. To begin with, risk-based 
approach to investment risk regulation would not clearly 
identify what constitutes an acceptable degree of risk for 
retail-specific investments.  Setting statutory limits on 
‘acceptable’ thresholds of risk would be an entirely 
arbitrary exercise and ultimately come to a political 
decision, hardly a desirable feature for competitive 
financial regulation: Would the threshold be defined as 
probability X of a potentially devastating six-sigma event? 
Would it be probability X that an investment of Y would 
lose more than Z? These legislative rules would be 
established ex-ante and could not be changed in a timely 
fashion as market conditions evolve. Changing the rules on 
predefined acceptable risk thresholds would be just as 
tedious an exercise as redefining the list of eligible assets 
under the current UCITS framework. 
In addition, technical difficulties would bedevil such an 
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instrument or portfolio position ex ante. Of course, it is 
possible to model the risk through simulations, but there is 
no guarantee that these simulations will prove to be 
reliable indicators of the riskiness of a position over the 
life of the investment, especially as regards tail risk, which 
is the risk that extreme events greatly influence 
(negatively) the realised gains of an investment. Tail risk is 
often ignored, because it involves modelling outcomes that 
are so far outside of the realm of normal course of events 
that they are considered virtually impossible or simply 
because it is difficult to pinpoint a good quantitative 
assessment of these risks. Nevertheless, there importance 
cannot be underestimated, as the LTCM saga in 1998 
highlighted. 
Though defining risk thresholds to regulate investment risk 
would be a more desirable approach than the current 
‘product approach’ and more in line with the lessons of 
modern portfolio theory (yet still undesirable in our view), 
it would probably be impracticable for the following 
reasons: 
  Probabilities are difficult to measure/set 
  Knowing ex-ante with certainty the level of risk in 
an asset/portfolio is impossible   
  Relying on simulations is risky due to the 
dependence of modelling on inputs 
  Past performance/risk  says little about possible 
future structural shifts in returns/risk patterns 
 
Essentially, what this section - and indeed this whole paper 
– have argued, is that moving towards a risk-based 
approach to managing (i.e. not regulating) investment risk 
is far preferable to the current product approach. A risk-
based approach will enhance flexibility and increase the 
potential for managers to generate greater returns for a 
given level of portfolio risk. However, moving towards a 
risk-based approach does not mean that investment risk 
would continue to be regulated through statutory rules as 
is currently the case under the UCITS Directive.  
If indeed a risk-based approach were adopted, who would 
be assigned the task of measuring the risk in UCITS 
portfolios? Would it be the fund manufacturer or the 
promoter/distributor? Or an independent party?  One of the 
dangers of such a decentralized, principles-based approach 
to risk delineation is that it could open the possibility of 
abuse, since it effectively devolves the risk measuring and 
policing function to the level of the management firm and 
distributors, which in turn could amplify conflicts of 
interest and encourage unscrupulous sales practices. 
Nevertheless, as was argued earlier in this paper, the 
UCITS Directive has a very sound framework for 
addressing these agency risks. Only if the Directive’s 
investor protection safeguards regarding conflicts of 
interest etc. are not properly applied can the risk based 
approach be a concern.  
A risk-based approach would depend crucially on 
independent advisors and the integrity of tied agents. 
Again, responsibility of the distributor/adviser to ensure 
that the product being marketed to a particular client 
matches that client’s needs in terms of the product’s 
return/risk profile and that the client has been adequately 
informed of the essential risk and return properties of the 
investment. 
One way to counter such a risk would be for independent 
bodies, such as rating agencies, to develop a rating system 
for the investment risk in UCITS funds. In such a system, a 
prerequisite for obtaining the UCITS label would be for a 
fund to deliver an independent risk rating: high 
risk/medium risk/low risk. When a fund is launched, an ex-
ante appreciation of risk would be offered (and mandatory 
for UCITS), but it would be periodically updated to reflect 
the current nature of risks in the portfolio as market 
conditions evolve. If ever the fund’s risk rating would 
change, the management company would be obliged to 
alert unit-holders and allow them to sell their stakes in the 
UCITS if the rating change would mean that the risk 
outlook would deteriorate beyond the investors’ 
subjectively defined acceptable risk threshold. 
Nevertheless, this proposal is not a cure-all for reason cited 
above regarding the technical difficulties associated with 




This Policy Brief has argued that there must be a 
fundamental rethink of the investor protection architecture 
which is built into the UCITS Directive. Although the 
Directive as it stands establishes statutory provisions to 
protect investors against the two main sources of risk 
investors face when entrusting their assets to a money 
manager, i.e., investment risk and agency risk, this Brief 
has sought to spell out why only agency risk, and not 
investment risk, ought to be regulated. The current product 
approach not only results in a laborious exercise of 
defining eligible assets (which is inevitably polluted by 
political considerations), but it also does not reflect the 
lessons of modern portfolio theory. 
The innovation of this Brief is that it clearly shows, 
through an (admittedly simple) quantitative example, that 
restrictions on investment policies both in terms of asset 
choice and strategies may well be to the detriment of retail 
investors. In our example, Portfolio 2, which is non-
UCITS eligible,  has outperformed the UCITS portfolio in 
all three categories that matter when comparing fund 
performance: it yields higher absolute returns, contains 
less risk, and offers a higher return for a given level of 
risk.  
As ever more new products and investment strategies 
challenge the existing regulatory framework and push the 
UCITS Directive to its limits, UCITS faces somewhat of 
an existential crisis today, leading to the question: “When 
is a UCITS a UCITS?”  14 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
The proposals in this Policy Brief would go a long way to 
answer this question and resolve the existential crisis. We 
argue that by throwing out the product approach and 
Section V of the Directive in order to move to a risk-based 
approach, a UCITS would no longer be defined by the 
products or investment restrictions it imposes, but rather 
by the comprehensive investor protection framework 
covering agency risk which is already in place (!). A 
UCITS would be a UCITS precisely when an investment 
fund is found to satisfy all the investor protection 
safeguards (setting up, operating conditions, authorization 
and disclosure) built into the directive, excluding Section 
V. UCITS therefore ought to be redefined as a 
comprehensive framework for investor protection in 
collective investment schemes, but not seek to regulate 
investment risk. Already, it is odd that regulatory 
approaches have not evolved. But as long as the product 
approach stays in place, the regulatory environment will 
continue to be out of sync with the lessons of modern 











The European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) was established as an independent non-
profit organisation in October 1993, in a collaborative effort by the European Federation 
of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS), the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) and the International Securities Market Association (ISMA), now the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA). ECMI is managed and staffed by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Its membership is composed of 
private firms, regulatory authorities and university institutes. 
European capital markets have experienced rapid growth in recent years, corresponding 
to the gradual shift away from relationship banking as a source of funding and at the 
same time, have had to absorb and implement the massive output of EU-level regulation 
required to create a single market for financial services. These developments, combined 
with the immense challenges presented European financial institutions by the 
globalisation of financial markets, highlight the importance of an independent entity to 
undertake and disseminate research on European capital markets. 
The principal objective of ECMI is therefore to provide a forum in which market 
participants, policy-makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions 
concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, fairness and competitiveness of 
European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. These exchanges are 
fuelled by the publications ECMI regularly produces for its members: quarterly 
newsletters, annual reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research 
papers, as well as occasional workshops and conferences. ECMI also advises European 
regulators on policy-related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction between 
academic research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a 
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